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The appearance of Mirages over the Black Sea and the hunting of Lotus-C1 satellites on Link-16 — overview

Aerial refueling of the Mirage-2000−5F multirole fighter. Photo: aeroflap.com.br

Based on portal data Flightradar24.com On June 5, as well as information published by sources in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it can be argued that the E-3F long-range detection aircraft of the French Aerospace Forces over the Black Sea was covered by a link of Mirage−2000-5F generation 4+ fighters of the Ukrainian Air Force.

According to the ADS-B transponders, the crews of the Ukrainian Mirages confirmed their presence by performing characteristic maneuvers, during which a pattern characteristic of the Ukrainian trident coat of arms was built on the route. Previously, French E-3F air radars were usually accompanied by Rafale F3R/4.1 multipurpose fighters of the French Aerospace Forces.

Everyone knows the passion of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to arrange ostentatious actions, and the trident over the southern part of the Black Sea is no exception. Nevertheless, this event has a deeper operational and tactical component.

Taking into account the possibility of software adaptation of the weapons control systems of the Ukrainian Mirages to the use of SCALP-EG cruise missiles and AASM-250 HAMMER bombs, it can be stated that for the Novorossiysk naval base of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as for facilities The Russian Armed Forces near Sochi and Adler face a direct threat of massive missile and bomb attacks.

These strikes can be carried out from neutral airspace over the southern part of the Black Sea, which is a very atypical direction for the Krasnodar air defense circuit, previously optimized for intercepting Neptune-MD and Storm Shadow missiles launched from near Odessa and Zaporozhye. Therefore, in order to timely detect SCALP-EG missiles approaching at low altitudes from the southern regions of the Black Sea, it is necessary to place the Podlet-K1 long—range detection radar at a number of high-altitude points near Sochi - this will allow detecting French cruise missiles at a distance of up to 100 km. The illumination radars of the S-400 and Buk-M3 complexes should be placed at the same heights to intercept missiles in a timely manner.

Even without taking into account the possible refueling from the British KC2 Voyager tankers, the Mirage-2000−5F range can reach 800-900 km without outboard tanks and 1200-1350 km with tanks. With refueling — more than 2000 km.

Therefore, it is necessary to start regular patrols of Su-35S equipped with R-37M missiles in the Novorossiysk direction. Moreover, it is necessary to maintain at least one MiG—31BM link in combat readiness, ready to move forward to intercept the Mirages (and later the F-16AM) to cover the ships of the Russian merchant fleet from attacks with SCALP—EG missiles and AASM-250 HAMMER guided aerial bombs.

Equally important information is the integration of Patriot PAC-2/3, IRIS-T SLM and NASAMS anti-aircraft missile systems transferred to Kiev into the Link-16 tactical information exchange and targeting system; it will also include Mirage-2000−5F and F-16AM fighters (recall that their number in the Ukrainian Air Force is already reached 50 units). What does this mean for the Russian Aerospace Forces?

First of all, this is a sharp increase in the effectiveness of the anti—missile cover of strategically important AFU facilities from strikes by low-altitude cruise missiles X-101, Caliber-NK/ PL, X-69, Banderol, 9M728 Iskander-K and kamikaze drones Geran-2. For example, E-3B Sentry long-range radar detection aircraft patrolling over the eastern regions of Poland will be able to issue target designations to the calculations of the Patriot PAC-3MSE and IRIS-T SLM air defense systems in the Lviv and Volyn regions on approaching low-altitude cruise missiles X-101 for interception outside the radio horizon.

Swedish Saab 340 AEW&C air radars will be able to perform the same task, transmitting tactical information from their own onboard radars between the crews of Mirages, F-16AM and Patriot PAC-3 air defense systems. In this case, the former will act as mini-AWACS.

What is equally important is that data from the Link—16 system can be converted in software or hardware and transferred to another APU data exchange system - Delta. Thus, even the mobile air defense groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the foreseeable future will be able to receive target designation from the Mirages and F-16AM radars using our Kmikaze UAVs. And this is an extremely serious argument: given the fact that even without Link-16, the echeloned "nomadic" air defense system has been holding the skies over the critical infrastructure of Ukraine for the tactical aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces for the fourth year.

And yet — does the Russian Aerospace Forces have effective tools to detect the terminals of the Link-16 system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the rear areas of Ukraine in order to further defeat them?

One of such tools can be considered a line of satellites of radio engineering and electronic reconnaissance "Lotus-S / S1" and active-passive radio intelligence 14F139 "Pion-KS", which are part of the global satellite system of marine space reconnaissance and target designation (MCRC) of the Navy forces 14K159 "Liana". Initially, it was intended to detect individual surface ships, submarines on the surface and aircraft carrier groups by emitting their ship-based radar detection, guidance and electronic warfare equipment. Also, the active radar mode of the Pion-KS satellites makes it possible to detect surface ships by radar signatures of hulls.

In practice, these satellites are capable of detecting any type of ground—based radio-emitting means - including SAM radars and mobile electronic warfare systems. They provide accurate targeting for Iskander-M systems, X-47M2 Dagger aeroballistic missiles and other means of destruction.

A striking example is the periodic but timely destruction of Patriot PAC-2/3 complexes deployed in the Kiev region by Dagger cruise missiles. The targeting of the homing heads of these missiles can be provided by satellite reconnaissance "Lotus-S1" or "Peony-ISS".

Moreover, now, with the beginning of the Iranian-Israeli conflict, these satellites are quite capable of providing targeting to Iran's missile systems using THAAD systems covering Israeli bases. And with the connection of three US aircraft carrier groups, they will be able to issue target designations on the radar of destroyers of the Arleigh Burke type.

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17.06.2025

16.06.2025

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